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non-condensing (indoor equipment). Humidity could affect the processor electronics by causing corrosion. This can be minimized by ensuring processor boxes or other housings have the correct IP rating for the environment in which they will be used. |
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What is the exposure to direct sunlight that can be expected? |
Solar radiation can affect the performance of some PIDS. Rapid changes in the exposure to solar radiation (e.g. caused by clouds moving across the sun) can impact the occurrence of false alarms. |
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What is the wind speed that can be expected? |
Range to be defined: up to 65 km/h High winds can cause sensor mountings to vibrate. Where units are positioned at either end of a zone, this can affect alignment of the units. The direction of the wind and how quickly it is changing can influence the number of false alarms. Objects may also be blown through the detection zone by high winds. |
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What is the rainfall / rain rate that can be expected? |
Range to be defined: up to 25 mm/hour Rainfall may cause false alarms; reduce the detection performance along the entire zone; or reduce the effective range of the detection zone. |
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What is the fog that can be expected? |
The effectiveness of infrared systems can be reduced in mist or fog. Fog may cause false alarms or alternatively reduce the detection performance by reducing the size of the detection zone. Fog can reduce the ease of alarm verification using CCTV. |
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What is the snowfall that can be expected? |
Range to be defined: up to 30 cm/hour Snowfall may cause false alarms or alternatively reduce the detection performance by reducing the size of the detection zone. |
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What are the freezing conditions (ground frost, ice) that can be expected? |
Freezing conditions can cause ice to build up on the surface of the sensors, reducing their detection performance. For some buried systems, a seasonal adjustment may be required. |
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What about the lightning strikes? |
Inside a radius of 1 km Lightning strikes can damage system electronics. |
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E.5. Wildlife |
Define possible wildlife in the near of the perimeter. |
Wildlife such as rabbits, foxes, dogs or birds often cause false alarms. Systems which are immune to false alarms from a few animals may still false alarm in the presence of large numbers of animals. |
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E.6. Public |
Define possible pedestrian access adjacent to the perimeter. |
Where people have access to the perimeter (e.g. a public footpath alongside the perimeter fence), radiating field systems (e.g. microwave systems) may detect them. |
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Are there many or few residents |
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adjacent to the perimeter? |
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Are there, e.g., stadiums, amusement parks, schools and sporting facilities in the immediate vicinity? |
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Or are there events in the surrounding area that attract a great many people? (e.g. a large, annual pop festival) |
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Є.7. Vegetation |
Define existing trees and vegetation near of the perimeter. |
Trees and vegetation encroaching into a detection field could cause false alarms when blown by winds. They may also produce fruit or organic debris which can fall into the detection zone. Grass, if left unmentioned, may cause false alarms when blown by the wind. Trees/vegetation can also be used to conceal an attacker. |
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Do trees and foliage obstruct visibility of the site? |
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E.8. Other indirect impact |
Define existing machinery near of the perimeter. |
Heavy machinery in the vicinity may cause vibrations and vibrate sensors out of alignment and cause false alarms. |
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Define existing underground and overhead power cables / supplies. |
Power cables, transformers etc. can result in electrical interference which may affect some PIDS. The presence of any power cables or supplies in or around the detection zone should be declared in the specification. Electrical shielding may be required to prevent these giving rise to false alarms. |
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Define existing drainage problems. |
A propensity for flooding or water saturation in any part of the detection zone may have significant impact on the suitability of some systems. For example, moving bodies of water can cause microwave systems to false alarm. Drainage may be installed to alleviate the problem. |
С.3 Organizational checklist for perimeter protection
What are the organizational factors that will influence the solution?
Table C.2 — Organizational checklist for perimeter protection
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0.1. General |
Are there developments in terms of the organization’s activities? |
New or other activities may give rise to new risks; further investigating needed. |
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Are there developments in terms of the level of threat? |
The threat level is subject to change, for example if a malicious event involving a similar organization has taken place, if a reorganization has taken place that may lead to dissatisfied employees or if the organization is in the public spotlight and therefore is attracting the attention of potential perpetrators. There may also be a case of an increased alert level. |
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0.2. Staff |
Who will be responsible for the system? |
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Who will monitor the PIDS? |
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What other duties will these staff have? |
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Who will have access to the system and what permissions should they have? |
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Who will be responsible for external investigation of alarms and detention of any intruders? |
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Who is to be notified of all alarms generated |
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Who will perform verification of alarm? |
Dedicated control room (requires pre/live/post video and/or audio)
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Who makes final decision? |
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Who will be notified of verification of intruder detection? |
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- Assigned personnel remote from secure area |
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0.3. Facilities |
Is a dedicated control room to be provided? |
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Will the PIDS be integrated into an existing security infrastructure? |
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How will be notified responsible staff for external investigation of alarms and detection of any intruders? |
- Mobile personnel notification equipment (radio, local pager, pager, mobile call, SMS) - Global notification equipment (bells, sirens, triggered lighting) - Control room notification (radio, local pager, pager, mobile call, SMS, email, GUI, mimic panel) |
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How will be notified responsible staff to perform verification of alarms? |
- Personnel notification equipment (radio, local pager, pager, mobile call, SMS, email, GUI, mimic panel) - Other |
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What form will the display take? |
Alarms can be displayed as a simple textbased list of alarms. Mimic panels can be used although these are becoming outdated and replaced with more sophisticated graphical user interfaces (GUIs). GUIs typically contain maps of the site with alarm locations overlaid to help operators quickly identify where the alarm originated. Alternatively the PIDS alarms could be integrated into a single GUI with other components of the security system, for example the CCTV system. Where screens are used to display information it is important that they are uncluttered and easy to view with the information presented in a clear, concise and easy to understand manner. The size of screen required to achieve this, relative to the viewing distance should also be considered. |
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0.4. Procedures |
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Are there procedures, training, and resources in place? |
If yes, are procedures clear and practiced regularly? Are there sufficient resources to carry out the procedures? |
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Are audits undertaken? |
If yes, how many times a year? Are there controls in place? |
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Is confirmation of alarms required? |
This can be in the form of audio or visual confirmation (this could be provided by CCTV cameras which on alarm are triggered to store footage from before, during and after the alarm) which is made available following an alarm activation. If the PIDS is to be supplied with a digital video recording system for the purpose of confirming alarms, the length of footage |
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recorded pre- and post-alarm should be specified as well as any requirement for redundant data storage (e.g. a RAID array) to reduce the likelihood of video data loss in the event of a hard-drive failing. It is recommended that where CCTV confirmation of alarms is to be used, the cameras be fixed to match the zones of the PIDS. This saves valuable time being lost aligning a PTZ camera to find any intruders following an alarm and may prevent recorded evidence from being lost. Audio confirmation of alarms can provide a cheaper alternative but relies on a skilled operator to interpret the audio recordings obtained. It is inherently less accurate than using video footage. |
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What information about the secure is required? |
- Breach of secure area (single zone) - Breach of specific zone |
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How will the alarms be evaluated and what would the operator be required to do? |
Alarm logs can be created automatically or manually by the operator. If logs are created manually this can provide the operator with a lot of extra work and could lead to some alarms being missed out by mistake. Logs created automatically on a computer system can be saved electronically or printed out to provide a permanent record of events. Actions which operators might be expected to perform are to ‘accept’ the alarm event (silence any audible signal); ‘verify’ the cause of the alarm event; deploy the required ‘response’ to the alarm event; add any extra details to the alarm log (e.g. observed cause); and then to reset the alarm event. Operators should be provided with clear instructions on how to determine the cause of alarms and what response is required for different types of alarm. Weather data could be used to help decide the likely cause of an alarm, however using it as the sole means of determining the cause of an alarm should be avoided wherever possible. Using complementary sources of information, like CCTV, to help determine the cause of an alarm will provide greater confidence that the correct cause of the alarm has been identified. |
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How will multiple alarms be processed? |
While multiple alarms on PIDS could be caused for example by heavy rain, the operators should be warned that multiple alarms may also be a deliberate diversion caused by a potential intruder. Consideration should be given to how multiple alarms will be stacked or queued by the entire system, or for an individual zone, and whether alarms from particular zones should be given higher priority. All tamper alarms should be investigated |
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promptly as they could indicate deliberate sabotage or a fault within the sensor. It is important to ensure that control room operator(s) are not overloaded and that the workload designated is realistically achievable. |
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What are actions on known false alarm (wildlife, environment)? |
- Log and do nothing - Log and call off further search (how) - Other |
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What are actions on unknown false alarm? |
- Log and do nothing - Log and call off further search (how) - Other |
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What are actions on verification of intruder detection? |
- Log and do nothing - Notify on-site active search team - Log and notify dedicated onsite intervention team (how) - Log and notify dedicated remote intervention team (how) |
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What happens in the event of power failure to the alarm enunciation / monitoring system? |
Should the system shut down non-essential services to maintain operation for as long as possible under UPS power? Should a controlled shutdown be initiated automatically on switching to UPS power? This can ensure a smooth start-up once the power supply is resumed. |
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How will system malfunctions and breakdowns be processed? |
It would be useful to have a comprehensive maintenance contract which specifies expected response times for repairing the PIDS should there be a fault as well as the acceptable limits on downtime as described in section 4.6. Further information on maintenance is provided in section 7 ‘Maintenance’ |
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What is acceptable timescale between alarm generation and information being processed? |
- Immediately (within 10 s) - Immediately (within a minute) - Immediately (within 10 min) - Post event |
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What is acceptable timescale between detection and verification? |
- Less than 1 min - Up to 10 min - Up to 1 h - No time limit |
Annex D
A perimeter security technologies classification
D.1 Introduction
WARNING: Any values given in this annex are indicative values and can vary according to the product or the regulation of sensibility.
The first draft of this annex originated from France.
One can rationally think that a device is designed for a use fitted for almost all situations and thus able to detect the more or less fast crossing of a target which can be a person or a vehicle.
However, some events have to be analysed and recognized as “no events of security’’ by the system in order to avoid a bad ratio between events of real insecurity and events connected to the operational environment. Sometimes, detection could be caused by small targets such as small animals or leaves; or detection could be caused by weather disturbances due to natural phenomena or movements situated outside the system detection zone. The characterization of a minimal security target (for example a person) can be considered as having minimal dimensions (25 x 40 x 120) or a minimum weight or a thermal mass.
Some criteria of characterization of the capacity of detection or no detection could be thus given with regards to a typical human target, having minimal values. This target shall generate an alarm with certainty when it evolves within the sensitive zone as defined by the system.
D.2 Four families for intrusion detection
D.2.1 Structure of the annex
In this annex a subdivision of the technologies of intrusion detection is proposed into four main families (clusters):
technologies of detection by means of stand-alone sensor and which analyses the variation of signals resulting from the crossing of a sensitive area situated above the ground (D.3);
technologies of detection by means of sensor (Integral) and intrusion detection signal being captured on the fence (D.4);
technologies of detection by means of sensor which is inseparable and is an integral part of the physical protection system (wall or fence) (D.5);
technologies of intrusion detection integrated in the ground (D.6).
A table for each family resumes exhaustively the technologies that have been identified: see Tables D.2 to D.5.
For each family, a list of technical and functional features details the possibilities and the limits of each technology, in the range of conditions of functioning in which the system in operational condition of detection can be operated.
D.2.2 Structure of the four main Tables D.3 to D.6
The following table gives the list of technical features and their subdivision as used in the tables for the four families of technologies of intrusion detection. This table also gives a brief explanation of the principles of functioning of each technology and the definition of every feature, offered or not, by each technology of detection.
Table D.1 — List of technical features and their subdivision
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Explanation |
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Detection zone features |
Range |
It is the nominal distance of detection starting from which the detector has the sensibility allowing the detection and the alarm triggering to operate in the event of a target crossing. |
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Width: volume or curtain |
For the systems whose zone of detection is linear, it indicates the typical necessary andor sufficient detection width to the technology. For the volumetric detectors, the feature is the one of the volume of detection defined by the minimal and the maximal width according to the distance. |
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Height |
Indicates the maximal of the nominal height of detection with respect to the ground. |
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Dead zone |
Indicates if a target of the size of a person cannot be detected on its smallest dimension (30 cm) on all or part of the nominal reach of the technology. |
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Detection on concave areas |
A ground which is not flat can generate shadow areas and cause detection failure. This criterion characterizes the possibility of being able to detect a target of 30 cm on all or part of the system reach representing a bump of xx cm. |
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Detection on convex areas |
Characterizes the possibility of detecting a crossing of a target of 30 cm with a hollow representing xx cm. |
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Disqualification/M asking |
The introduction of an obstacle in the field of detection can enable the system to detect all or part of the zone of nominal detection. This feature allows to inform if the technology is capable of detecting a partial or total masking caused by any kind of obstacles which would be added anywhere in the zone of detection. |
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Configuration of the width or sensitivity of the detection zone |
Allows indication if the zone of detection is limited, in order to avoid detecting a crossing beyond the zone defined by the range, the width and the height wished particularly those which have been determined and tested at the time of the initial parameter setting. |
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Technology |
Optical, radiofrequency, thermal, seismic |
Characterizes one or several physical signals making the technology |
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Detection features |
Vertical detection |
Allows the determination of capacity of detection of a target having the height of a man crawling (30 cm) over all the nominal reach of the system (except dead angle already characterized later) to be determined. |
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Ground-level detection |
Allows the determination of the capacity of detection of an object having a dimension of xx cm when it crosses the sensitive zone beyond a certain height, for example, a 1 m height (jumping). |
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Minimum intrusion speed |
Allows characterization of the minimal speed that a target of 30 cm height evolving in the ground will have to be completely detected by the nominal reach of the system (expressed in cm/second). Remark: We can rationally think that a person cannot evolve slowly other than with support taken in the ground. |
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Maximum intrusion speed |
Allows characterization of the maximal speed that a target having a minimal dimension of xx cm height shall not exceed in order to be detected in a sure way by the system on the totality of its range of detection. |
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