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1.2 Access and road network

2.4 Crime rate in neighbourhood compared to national 1 average

low 1 1

medium 5 5

medium - 5 8

high - 10 15

Subtotal 4 Access

55

Subtotal 4 Score

5. Modus operand!

   1. Introduction

Most breaches of perimeter security on a site are committed because aggressors enjoy opportunities: easy access, hiding places, absence of demarcation of the site, poor lighting and/or favourable landscaping. It is important to analyse and identify in order to understand the motivation of potential aggressors.

Modus operandi should cover all combinations of:

aggressor type (5.2);

scenario to breach the perimeter (5.3);

toolset (5.4).

The aggressor type is the most important 'constituent' of the Modus operandi. Four Modus operandi (MO 1 to MO 4) should cover all possible situations with intended breach of the perimeter. Further detailed descriptions are deemed irrelevant, as it does not add to the ways the attack will take place, nor will it differentiate in the perseverance of the potential attacker.

Four aggressor type are distinguished:

1. Opportunist - vandalism and theft;

2. Activist;

3. Organized crime (creating opportunity, experienced);

4. Terrorist.

The types reflect the level of know-how, preparation and motivation of the attacker. For example, opportunists are those who will commit an offence if the opportunity presents itself. They are interested in sites with easy access, a low level of surveillance and ready escape routes.

A more experienced aggressor will, prior to carrying out an offence, conduct an important phase of gathering information. It is also probable that he will have a specific target in mind and may be prepared to use more effective tools to gain entry to the site. He very often has expertise in bypassing or sabotaging mechanical, electronic or CCTV and electronic detection devices.

The most likely methods to breach the perimeter are:

walk in;

reach over;

climb over;

go underneath;

swim/sail over inland water;

intrusion with hand tools;

intrusion with electric/pneumatic toolset;

intrusion with hydraulic tools;

vehicle intrusion/attack.

To be able to choose the proper Modus operandi, the tools the attacker may be expected to use have to be determined or chosen.

The user of the present classification methodology might want to choose his own list. A list distinguishing between three toolsets is given here as an example:

1. manual, easily-portable tooling crowbar, handsaw, hammer and pliers;

2. intermediate tooling including battery-operated tools, car jack;

3. power operated tools including petrol-driven tools.

NOTE If a fixed list of pre-defined toolsets is considered necessary, the development such list will be part of the future activities.

5. Risk assessment methodology

   1. General

Although the methods for risk assessment for perimeter protection can be generic, a risk assessment itself shall be conducted specifically for each site. It should take into account the perimeter and its location, the assets on the site, their value and their function and the threats and their probability.

Completing the risk assessment itself is a task performed by people. It is a task that is highly influenced by a number of (subjective) factors such as: moment in time, past experiences, interaction of stakeholders, skills and competences of the people involved and complexity of the situation. The validity of a risk assessment therefore depends on the availability of a comprehensive structure and the minimization of interpretation.

The risk assessment has to be conducted from the customer/user point of view and not from the product point of view. Considering the purpose of the risk assessment itself, it is of importance that all relevant stakeholders are involved in the assessment and that the assessment is formally accepted by the customer. Stakeholders are everyone who has an interest in the security of the site including site owner, site users, budget holders and security managers.

Risk is defined by the probability of an event multiplied by its impact. For a site owner or user of a site, the risks to analyse can be (see Questionnaires 1.1 to 1.3):

NOTE It has been noted that the 'human aspect’ is missing. It is possible therefore that risks like ’Trauma to people’, ’Image damage’ and Damage to society/public’ will be considered in the future.

Threats can be:

1. burglary - thefts of goods, thefts of information, thefts of data;

2. vandalism;

3. aggression to people;

4. sabotage;

5. damage by arson;

6. product contamination;

7. espionage;

8. escape;

9. non complying I breach of health and safety regulations.

The threats enter the questionnaire through the choice of the risk level (risk value) taken into account.

Site characterization with regard to e.g. surroundings, access and use should be reviewed in order to determine vulnerability and necessary resistance methods.

See Questionnaires 1.1 to 1.6:

6.4.3 Human and social factors of the environment

See Questionnaires 2.1 to 2.3:

6.4.4 Use of the site

See Questionnaire 3.1:

3.1 Periods of occupancy - human presence:

Daytime;

Full time 24/7;

Seasonal.

6.4.5 Type of access

See Questionnaires 4.1 to 4.4:

7. Level of protection

Once the value for 'Potential risk' and 'Site characterization' have been established, the required level of protection has to be determined. This step is rather intuitive and subjective, since clear procedures for this are not (yet) available.

However, by assessing the sensitivity of use of the calculation model for various situations, which the user may have select himself, the user can tune in on the following classification

:Table 1 — Nature of the problem and Level of protection

7. Determining functional requirements

   1. Introduction

The aggregation of Level of Protection, Modus Operandi and Site Characterization will define, as a result, a Desired Performance as required by the site owner or user regarding the perimeter protection system. With the criteria described in the Desired performance the functional requirements need to be determined.

The desired Level of protection is the main determining factor. Data about the Modus operandi and from the Site characterization are more or less 'boundary conditions'.

A preliminary, indicative first impression of possible solutions given a desired Level of protection, may be as follows:

Table 2 — Level op protection and indicative solution

In the process of actually formulating the functional requirement the following three main questions have to be answered:

What should the system do?

How well / to what degree should the system do that?

- Why?

While identifying the actual objectives/requirements the following (non-exhaustive) list can be used:

1. restrict area perimeter - demarcation;

2. secure site assets - protecting assets and persons;

3. regulate flow of persons and vehicles;

4. control flow persons and vehicles;

5. creating time to respond:

1. deter;

2. detect;

3. delay;

4. deny.

7. Elements of possible solutions

   1. Introduction

Perimeter protection is all about deterrence, detection, assessment and delaying of the intrusion for a intervention and response is initiated. Every solution needs to match the criteria set in the functional requirements of the site to be protected.

Operating environment, perimeter protection construction, security history, site layouts, surrounding environment, activity in and around the site, local weather conditions are all factors to be considered when planning a perimeter protection system solution. These influence the detection technologies selected and as a consequence the overall performance of the system.

Often the final perimeter protection solution will consist of several different but complementary technologies to form layers of protection.

In this clause a quick survey is given regarding possible solutions to meet the functional requirements providing an adequate match. In Clause 10 'Inventories' an overview is given of all the annexes with the Inventories that have been made.

Distinction is made between the following elements of a possible solution:

elements of delay;

elements of detection;

external elements;

local law and regulations.

A combination of the above measures is needed to provide a level of delay commensurate to the maximum response time from detection of intruder to interception; and to facilitate intervention.