---

3.2.20

microphonic

use of piezoelectric or triboelectric cables to detect audio frequency vibrations effectively acting as a microphone

[SOURCE: Centre for Applied Science and Technology (CAST)]

3.2.21

minimum target dimensions

minimum dimensions of a target that can cross the detection zone and be successfully detected

3.2.22

minimum target mass

minimum mass of a target that can cross or interact with the detection zone and be successfully detected

3.2.23

minimum speed of crossing

minimum speed (metres per second) at which a target crossing the detection zone can travel and be successfully detected

3.2.24

monitoring centre

private or public place staffed 24 h which takes action on receiving the remote alarm transmissions from automatic intrusion or fire detection systems

[SOURCE: EN 14383-1: 2006]

3.2.25

passive infrared

detectors sense the temperature contrast between an intruder and the background environment [2]

3.2.26

perimeter intruder detection system (PIDS)

external detection systems configured to detect a human target crossing from one side of a linear detection zone to the other

[SOURCE: Centre for Applied Science and Technology (CAST)]

3.2.27

post-mounted PID

wire or cable based perimeter intruder detection system mounted on posts attached to the barrier or mounted directly in front of or behind the barrier

[SOURCE: Centre for Applied Science and Technology (CAST)]

3.2.28

radar

antenna sends out a radio frequency pulse and detects the reflections from intruders and can determine their distance and speed

[SOURCE: Centre for Applied Science and Technology (CAST)]

Note 1 to entry: The antenna can either be static (linear) or rotating (wide area).

3.2.29

range (detection)

nominal maximum distance from a detector at which a detection system can be expected to generate an alarm in the event of a target crossing

3.2.30

tamper alarm

alarm generated by the system to indicate its integrity has been compromised

[SOURCE: Centre for Applied Science and Technology (CAST)]

Note 1 to entry: Typically this is a result of someone gaining access to the control circuitry or causing damage to the system.

3.2.31

target classification

capacity of a system to provide information pertaining to the target such as dimensions; or to categorize the likely intrusion type in addition to an alarm

3.2.32

target location

capacity of system to provide information as to the location of the target within the detection zone, in addition to an alarm

3.2.33

taut wire

wires under tension are monitored by mechanical sensors for changes in tension caused by intrusion events

[SOURCE: Centre for Applied Science and Technology (CAST)]

Note 1 to entry: Hybrid electrified taut wire systems are also available.

3.2.34

true alarm

any alarm or group of alarms caused by a human crossing the specified detection zone

[SOURCE: Centre for Applied Science and Technology (CAST)]

3.2.35

video-monitoring (CCTV)

technical means by which camera captured images are gathered, observed, stored, processed and transmitted (CCTV: Closed Circuit Television)

[SOURCE: EN 14383-1: 2006]

3.2.36

video motion detection

computer software that analyses video footage for motion or characteristics typical of an intrusion event by means of analyzing variations between video frames

[SOURCE: Centre for Applied Science and Technology (CAST)]

3.2.37

vulnerability to defeat

assessment of a system’s vulnerability to disruption or sabotage by a knowledgeable attacker intent on disabling it

[SOURCE: Centre for Applied Science and Technology (CAST)]

3.2.38

width of detection

nominal maximum width of detection zone (for systems whose zone of detection is linear)

active system

security barrier which requires operation either by personnel or powered equipment

[SOURCE: PAS 38:2013]

Note 1 to entry: For example a manual dropping/ lifting-arm barrier or an automated retractable/rising bollard.

mechanical device to control the passage of vehicles (hand or power operated)

manufactured product which, once positioned, is a vertical device aimed at delimiting an area and hampering the access for vehicles

[SOURCE: EN 14383-1: 2006, modified]

folding gate

gate with two or more hinged leaves, guided and/or supported at the bottom and/or at the top

Note 1 to entry: The first leaf is hinged to the frame; leaves can be hinged only on one side of the frame or on both sides.

gate/door

device to close an opening in a boundary demarcation which is provided for the passage of vehicles and/or persons (hand or power operated)

hinged gate

gate with a leaf which is hinged or pivoted at one side which opens one way (single leaf or double leaf hinged gate)

locking system

equipment used to prevent an opening device from being opened without the use of a key or other mechanism designed for this purpose

[SOURCE: EN 14383-1: 2006]

planter

massive or well-anchored container (wood, concrete, steel, etc.) filled with soil and decorated with plants for the purpose of stopping vehicles

[SOURCE: EN 14383-1: 2006]

retractable bollards

device which can easily be lowered and secured in its position with a key (mechanical) or through a powered mechanism (automatic)

[SOURCE: EN 14383-1: 2006]

device to stop vehicles, e.g. retractable ramps

[SOURCE: EN 14383-1: 2006]

sliding gate

gate with a leaf or leafs that moves horizontally in its guides (cantilever or moving on a roller rail)

Note 1 to entry: There are single leaf or bi-parting or telescopic sliding gates (gate leaf consisting of two or more parts).

speed gate

folding or sliding gates with one or more leaf (leaves) designed for rapid operation (> 0,5 m/s)

sterile zone

defined controlled area, normally clear of obstructions and undergrowth, incorporating measures to preclude larger wildlife and accidental incursion from personnel

[SOURCE: Centre for Applied Science and Technology (CAST)]

form of gate which allows one person to pass at a time (and or power operated)

Note 1 to entry: Full-height turnstiles are similar in operation to a revolving door.

traffic calming

use of self enforcing physical measures to produce road alignments that require a reduction in vehicle speed in order to be successfully negotiated

[SOURCE: PAS 38:2013]

vehicle airlock system

system created by using two active barriers of any type across the vehicle path of approach, with a secure sterile area between the barrier

[SOURCE: PAS 38:2013]

vehicle security barrier

system designed and installed to bring to rest or redirect an impacting vehicle

[SOURCE: PAS 38:2013]

4. Performance classification methodology

   1. Outline of the approach

Unprotected perimeters mean unprotected assets, unprotected people and inevitably security breaches. The consequences of these breaches can be catastrophic so the threat of intrusion remains a prime concern at all major facilities.

The approach presented in this report starts with a calculation model that generates a score indicating the required level of protection.

Important key questions for the client are:

What are my assets I should be protecting?

Against what threats?

What are my vulnerabilities and risks?

Once the required level of protection has been established, the basic performance requirement, the required time of delay, has to be determined or chosen.

It is possible that other more general functional requirements have been identified during the process. The complete set of functional requirements and performance defines the overall set of requirements the perimeter security (system) solution has to meet.

Given the available elements for a perimeter security solution and their individual performance characteristics, most likely various security systems can be generated that meet the overall set of requirements. A schematic view of this approach is given in Annex B, 'Framework for perimeter protection systems evaluation'.

The assessment of the desired performance of the perimeter protection system is based on two variables:

The first variable is related to risks, threats and vulnerability. By filling out a questionnaire regarding risks and threats the user of the method can get a clear understanding of his current situation. For such an analysis, the scenarios to be expected have to be defined along with the toolset the intended aggressor may use (together, forming the Modus operandi). The outcome is a number for the Potential risk. Based on the Potential risk the desired Level of protection is chosen.

The second variable is related to the site. In the second part of the questionnaire site characteristics are evaluated such as surroundings roads and practical conditions of use. The outcome is a number for the site characterization.

NOTE This number is similar to 'Potential significance' as used by CEN/TC 325.

The Potential risk and the Site characterization combined define the Level of protection, which is the starting point to identify the necessary Functional requirements.

The methodology described above is implemented in a calculation model. Figure 1 presents an overview of the elements of the method.

REQUIREMENTS

Questionnaire

Figure 1 —Subsequent steps in the assessment model

The description of the elements shown in Figure 1 is given in the following subclauses on the calculation model.

The following assumptions and starting points have been used to compose the questionnaire and the calculation model to determine the numbers for the Potential risk and the Site characterization.

1. Relevant aggressor types:

Four aggressor types should be sufficient to cover the Modus operandi with intended breach of the perimeter. More detail will not add relevant information on the ways the attack will take place, nor will it differentiate better in the perseverance of the potential attacker. The four aggressor types reflect mainly the level of know-how, preparation and motivation.

2. Terrorist attack:

In case the Modus operandi involves the potential threat of a terrorist attack, the perimeter protection shall always involve extensive (organizational) measures.

3. Multiple Modus operandi:

In case several risks are involved with different Modus operandi, the model requires the highest risk be chosen.

1. It can be the case that different risks require different security measures. For instance if an activist is likely to pass over a fence (to make a statement) and a thief is likely to penetrate the fence to be able to transport the stolen goods.

2. The model identifies the highest risk, but compartments (a lay-out of the site in different zones) can apply to select areas with lower required levels of security. However, this requires that the user knows what the highest risk (factor) is.

NOTE An option would be to add the risks (combine the scores), but this complicates the model with little to gain. Alternatively, one could compare the scores before continuing in the questionnaire to the section on Site characterization.

4. Inside and outside:

All valuables on the site are applicable to the risk assessment, both inside as well as outside the buildings.

NOTE CEN/TC 388 and CEN/TC 325 have a different perspective as illustrated in Figure 2.

scope CEN/TC388

scope CEN/TC325

Figure 2 — Different perspectives of CEN/TC 388 and CEN/TC 325

5. First choose the relevant Modus operandi, and then fill in the model.

If the scenario is an attack by an activist, and there is no risk of taking any valuables (there are no valuables), then MO 1 should be chosen. Multiplication with a risk factor would make no sense for this threat.

If the scenario is an attack by an activist, and there is a medium threat for business continuity, then MO 2 should be chosen. Multiplication with the risk factor 1,5 would be appropriate.

NOTE For most Modus operandi only the impact on one or two risk in the calculation model (out of 1.1., 1.2, 1.3) are relevant. The total maximum score of 90 requires a terrorist threat on all three items.

6. Consider geographic spread of occupancy

This parameter measures to what extend the site/buildings are monitored by personnel during operating hours through their presence at the site.

NOTE At a highly monitored site every part is in use and monitored at least each 30 min.

7. Access requirements influence the risk for a site

The access requirements regarding vehicles, people and goods require suitable security measures. A site which is visited by external parties, at irregular times including the nights, has a greater security risk then a site which is used only by personnel at regular time frames.

NOTE Access requirements have influence on the quality of the gates, the number of entrance points, time that a gate can remain open, or the way people are monitored at a site and have authorization to access the site at different timeframes.

Answers to relevant questions regarding risks and site characterization should be given in the form of a score selected from the range of factors and the subtotals expressed as a percentage of the maximum value.

Figure 3 gives a partial picture of the first part of the data entry sheet of the calculation model. The risk level value is multiplied by the МО-dependent risk factor. Both the МО-dependent risk factor and the risk level value (for risk 1.1 Importance of goods) are marked in light grey.

Figure 3 — Data entry sheet calculation model (partial)

NOTE 1 The wording 'potential risk' is used here instead of simply 'risk' since CEN/TC 325 uses this terminology. As for 'potential significance' the present document does not follow CEN/TC 325. The wording 'site characterization' is used for that part of the classification methodology.

Both the MO-dependent risk factor and the risk level values (see 4.4.2) are to be considered as preliminary values still to be discussed further. In fact that holds for the whole of the questionnaire.

NOTE 2 The question of the types of risks is a good example for this. In the questionnaire three risks are mentioned. Yet it has been noted that the 'human aspect' is missing. It is possible therefore that risks like 'Trauma to people', 'Image damage' and Damage to society/public' will be considered a future version.

4.4.2 Text of the questionnaire annex data entry sheet

More detailed information on the key elements of the questionnaire can be found in Clause 5 'Modus operand!' and Clause 6 'Risk assessment methodology'. Below the full text of the (present version of the) questionnaire is given: