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H.4 Ultrasonic movement detectors

Movement detectors employing ultrasonic techniques are susceptible to particular types of influences examples of which are included below:

1. sources of extraneous (ultrasonic) noise, e.g. telephone bells, compressors, refrigerators etc;

2. excessive draughts, or any other air movements, e g. heating or ventilation equipment;

3. changes in relative humidity;

4. interaction with other ultrasonic detectors;

5. mounting height of detectors which can influence detection capability.

H.5 Microwave detectors

Movement detectors employing microwave techniques are susceptible to particular types of influences, examples of which are included below:

1. assurance that detection coverage is confined to supervised premises;

EXAMPLE No penetration of building fabric by microwave energy.

2. liquid moving in plastic pipes;

3. interaction with other detectors;

4. interference from fluorescent lamps;

5. distortion of coverage pattern by metal or other reflective surfaces;

6. movement or vibration of

1. metal objects within the boundary of coverage of the detector, e.g. metal pipes,

2. large metal objects outside the boundary of coverage.

H.6 Passive infra-red movement detectors

Movement detectors employing passive infra-red techniques are susceptible to particular types of influences, examples of which are included below:

1. objects in the field of view which can experience rapid changes of temperature;

EXAMPLE Heaters, radiators.

2. draughts across the face of a detector;

3. direct sunlight on detectors;

4. hot or cold air turbulence;

5. under-floor heating;

6. direct light on the face of a detector;

EXAMPLE Car headlights, flashlights.

7. siting of multiple element sensors only where the reference area for both elements are subject to similar temperature changes;

EXAMPLE From carpets and furniture.

8. ingress of insects into the detector;

EXAMPLE Use detectors with adequate sealing.

H.7 Multi technology devices

Multiple technology detectors may include two or more detector technologies, e.g. passive infra-red and microwave.

As each is susceptible to different influences consideration should be given to any which might affect the performance of the overall detector. Examples of other issues to be considered are included below:

1. all factors relevant to each individual technology;

2. independent test facilities for each technology;

3. consideration of the detection pattern of both or all technologies to ensure a common detection pattern is achieved.

H.8 Vibration and seismic detector

Examples of issues which should considered when proposing vibration or seismic detectors are included below.

1. ambient vibration level;

2. secure attachment of the detector to a smooth, solid surface;

3. changes to the fabric, or cracks in the fabric of the structure, which might alter the detection characteristics;

4. use of differing building materials with different vibration characteristics;

5. selection of detectors with characteristics suitable for the characteristics of the building fabric;

6. effect of temperature changes;

EXAMPLE The expansion or contraction of building materials generating vibrations in the structure.

7. avoidance of the ingress of water or damp into the detector or condensation on glass;

8. testability of the detector.

H.9 Break-glass detectors

The performance of break-glass detectors can be significantly affected by the type of glass being protected and the adhesive used. Examples of these and other factors which should be considered when proposing this type of detector are included below:

1. installation only on glass i.e. not on polycarbonate sheeting;

2. reduction of performance if fitted on laminated glass or glass fitted with plastic film;

3. installation should not be on cracked glass or glass not securely fitted to frame;

4. adequate attachment to glazing, special care should be taken when fitting to patterned glass;

5. use of correct adhesive in accordance with manufacturers recommendations;

6. possibility of removing glass from frame without activating the detector.

H.10 Acoustic glass-break detectors

The following issues should be considered:

1. observation of the manufacturer’s requirements if used for supervising:

1. glazing with plastic film,

2. laminated glass,

3. wired glass;

2. air space between the detector and glass to be supervised;

EXAMPLE Acoustically damping (soft) coverings will tend to decrease range/sensitivity.

3. minimisation of unwanted alarms due to noises with similar characteristics to breaking glass;

EXAMPLE Jangling objects (keys) or bells.

4. the effect on performance of floor and wall coverings.

EXAMPLE Acoustically reflective (hard) coverings will tend to increase range/sensitivity.

H.11 Infra-red beam interruption devices

The following issues should be considered:

1. protection against mechanical damage if necessary;

2. only use mirrors which are supplied with the detector;

3. avoidance of multi-path reflection not part of detector pattern;

4. prevention of vehicle lights or sunlight falling on receivers;

5. the effect of heaters in path of the beam;

6. avoidance of the beam passing through glass or other attenuating material.

H.12 Continuous wiring

The following issues should be considered:

1. configuration of wiring to detect the anticipated method of attack;

EXAMPLE A hand-hole or total access.

2. secure attachment and design to prevent removal of the detection wire without activation;

EXAMPLE The use of anchor loops.

3. installation only on a suitable surface which cannot damage the wiring;

4. siting of detection wiring only within the supervised premises;

5. consideration of environmental conditions;

EXAMPLE Do not install in damp areas or on damp surfaces.

6. protection against accidental damage;

EXAMPLE Shield wires against physical damage.

7. configuration to detect a break or short circuit;

8. continuously monitoring for early detection of faults;

lx) attachment to surfaces in a manner which will avoid stretching.

H.13 Acoustic detectors

The following issues should be considered:

1. avoidance of acoustically noisy environments;

2. preference of use in an acoustically hard environment;

3. use in small areas i.e. where better performance may be expected;

4. consideration of the effects of intermittent noises;

EXAMPLE Telephone bells.

H.14 Conductive foil - General considerations

The following issues should be considered:

1. configuration of foil to detect the anticipated method of attack;

EXAMPLE Total access or hand access.

2. installation of foil only within the supervised premises;

3. continuously monitoring for early detection of faults;

4. avoidance of repair, i.e. if damaged, foil should be replaced;

5. consideration of methods of protecting foil against accidental damage;

EXAMPLE By window cleaners or children when proposed for shops.

6. consideration of the suitability of the material to which the foil is to be attached and the method of fixing;

7. assurance of detection of anticipated method of attack.

H.15 Conductive foil on glass

The following issues should be considered:

1. possibility of removing glass from the frame without creating an alarm condition;

2. use on glass which will break cleanly;

EXAMPLE Do not use on laminated glazing or polycarbonate sheeting etc.

3. attachment to glass in accordance with manufacture’s recommendations;

4. avoidance of fitting on damaged or defective glazing;

EXAMPLE On cracked glass.

5. positioning of take-off points to avoid the effects of condensation;

6. use of properly designed interconnections to bridge between window frame and glazing or between panes of glass.

H.16 Protective switches

The following issues should be considered:

1. positioning to detect the opening of doors or windows or the removal of objects;

2. installation within supervised premises;consideration of the size of the opening for access or the removal of objects and positioning of switches accordingly;

EXAMPLE Entry of person or entry of hand.

3. positioning of switches in a manner which will prevent the switch operating due to the normal movement of the object to which the switch is to be attached (or the movement of the object to which the magnet is attached when magnetically operated switches are used);

EXAMPLE Rattling doors or windows.

4. consideration of factors which might affect reliability or security:

1. use of magnetically operated switches on ferrous metal structures, e.g. use non-ferrous brackets;

2. installation in a position where the switch cannot be easily overcome, e.g. by use of thin metal strip to hold back an actuating lever;

3. installation in a position where the switch cannot be deliberately activated, e.g. under a display item;

4. assurance that a switch is firmly fixed;

5. consideration of environmental conditions and selection of a switch suitable for the conditions in which it must operate.

EXAMPLE Waterproof switches on roller shutters.

H.17 Capacitance detectors

The follows, issues should be considered:

1. installation in a stable environment;

EXAMPLE Where capacitance between the ground plane and the supervised object is not subject to rapid changes.

2. consideration of the effect of adjacent metal objects;

3. assurance that detection coverage is confined to the supervised object.

H.18 Pressure mats

The following issues should be considered:

1. avoidance of installation in high traffic areas;

2. concealment of pressure mats;

3. consideration of whether to use open or closed circuit monitoring;

4. consideration of how replacement mats can be installed;

EXAMPLE When under fitted carpets.

5. avoidance of hazardous environmental conditions;

EXAMPLE Humidity resulting in moisture forming.

6. means of interconnection.

EXAMPLE The type of wiring used should be discreet and robust.

H.19 Taut wire

The following issues should be considered:

1. changes of temperature and humidity;

2. installation within the supervised premises;

3. configuration to detect anticipated method of attack.

H.20 Hold-up devices

The following issues should be considered:

1. hold-up devices should only be triggered by a deliberate manual action;

2. each hold-up device should be identifiable after triggering;

3. hold-up devices should be easy accessible to users;

4. hold-up devices should be sited in a way that triggering is not visible to the robber;

5. in dwellings hold-up devices could be located in bedrooms, living room, close to access door(s);

6. in commercial and industrial premises hold-up devices could be located near access to specific security areas, e.g. cash offices;

7. measures against unintended triggering:

1. siting not in close proximity to electrical switches,

2. siting on different height to electrical switches,

3. special consideration for foot-operated hold-up devices (e.g. cleaner problem).

There may be an indication of the triggering of a hold-up device. This indication should only be given in an area separated from the area where the hold-up device is sited.

H.21 Control and indicating equipment and power supplies

The following issues should be considered:

1. avoidance of installation in areas to which the public have access;

2. installation within the supervised premises with easy access for maintenance;

3. avoidance of mounting on a perimeter wall if not of substantial construction;

4. provision of adequate indications for fault or alarm identification purposes;

5. design of entry and exit procedures to minimise unwanted alarm activations;

6. assurance that event log capacity is consistent with the size and complexity of the IAS;

NOTE EN 50131 -1:2006 includes requirements for event recording.

7. provision of adequate test facilities for users and those responsible for maintaining the IAS;

8. selective walk test mode for large l&HAS with many detectors distributed throughout a large building;

9. the ability to confirm which detectors have operated correctly during and following a detector test;

10. connection of the power supply to the mains network within the supervised premises;

11. provision of a power supply solely for the use of the l&HAS;

12. connection to the mains supply via a fused spur point (recommended for grade 2, 3 and 4 l&HAS) alternatively in grade 2 l&HAS connection to the mains supply may be made via an un-switched socket provided the inadvertent removal of the plug is prevented;

13. connection to the mains supply via an un-switched socket dedicated to the CIE (recommended only for grade 1 l&HAS);

14. provision of adequate ventilation for the power supply;

15. deactivation of the means of isolation/inhibiting/unsetting of hold-up devices.

H.22 Ancillary control equipment

The following issues should be considered:

1. fixed ACE:

1. location consistent with ease of operation, in particular setting/unsetting and part set,

2. location suitable for disabled persons,

3. siting to prevent observation of the operation of the keypad (if provided) by unauthorised persons unless shielded or scrambled,

4. consideration of environmental conditions if mounted externally;

2. portable ACE:

1. influences from other RF applications,

2. maintenance of batteries.

H.23 Actions to prevent inadvertent operation

The following issues should be considered:

1. inclusion of a pre-alarm warning if l&HAS is activated during the entry procedure;

2. responsibility of a single body (company or individual) for the operation of l&HAS installed in a multi-occupancy building;

3. when part setting of l&HAS is provided consideration of the inclusion of a pre-alarm warning if the system is activated during setting or unsetting;

4. restriction of access to functions of the CIE which could influence the operation of l&HAS to properly trained and competent personnel;

5. prevention of inadvertent access to the supervised premises when the system is set;

EXAMPLE Mechanical securing of all doors to the supervised premises when l&HAS is set.

6. consideration of access via the designated entry door in the design of the entry and exit procedures.

H.24 Alarm transmission systems

The following issues should be considered:

1. concealment of alarm transmission path wiring as far as is practical;

2. consideration of factors which might prevent the transmission of an alarm signal;

EXAMPLE Company switch boards (PABX).

3. monitoring of the availability of the local alarm transmission path;

EXAMPLE Monitoring the dial tone.

4. measures to prevent incoming calls blocking the transmission of messages when the SPT is connected to PSTN lines. A separate line is recommended;

5. means to prevent the inadvertent disconnection of plug-in transmission lines;

EXAMPLE A telephone socket with a locking facility.

6. inclusion of lightning protection devices where transmission cables are run on poles adjacent to the supervised premises;

7. installation of SPT within the supervised premises in a discreet location.

In case of SPT using radio frequency communications: location of the antenna considering tamper risk and antenna characteristics.

H.25 External warning devices

The following issues should be considered:

1. siting in a prominent position;

2. accessibility to authorised personnel without compromising audibility to the general public;

3. siting to minimise risk of accidental or intentional damage;

4. siting to provide reasonable access for servicing (with due regard to i) to iii) above);

5. concealment of any external wiring or provision of the appropriate level of tamper protection;

6. when two WD are provided and simultaneous attack is anticipated siting the two WD as far apart as possible;

7. secure mounting to the building structure.

National legislation concerning noise pollution should be considered.

No WD operation when a hold-up device is triggered.

H.26 Internal warning device

The following issues should be considered:

1. proximity to CIE or ACE (in l&HAS grades 3 and 4);

EXAMPLE The WD should not be sited immediately adjacent to CIE or ACE.

2. siting inside the supervised premises in a position that is accessible for servicing;

3. siting should not compromise the security and the audibility of the device.

H.27 External box for retaining keys

The following issues should be considered:

1. supervision against opening and removal;

2. concealment of external wiring or provision of the appropriate level of tamper protection;

3. adequate level of lock security according to risk assessment.

Annex I
(informative)

System record (log book)

Example of a system record (log book) which could be used to record events.

EXAMPLE Maintenance visits, unwanted alarms, faults, tests, temporary disconnections and repair visits. A brief note of any work carried out or outstanding should be made.

Reference data:

Name and address:

Responsible person:

l&HAS installed by:

l&HAS maintained by:

Monitored by:

Telephone number:

Date:

Date:

Date:

Date:

Date:

should be contacted if service required.

Event data:

E

Replacement due:

xpendable components:

Annex J
(informative)

Maintenance

J.1 Maintenance - Equipment

Equipment should be maintained in accordance with manufacturer's recommendations.

J.2 Maintenance - l&HAS

Maintenance (inspections and tests) should include the following:

1. tamper detection;

2. setting and unsetting;

3. entry and exit procedures;

4. power supplies;

5. functioning of detectors and/or hold-up devices;

6. operation of warning devices;

7. operation of ATS.

Care should be taken to ensure the equipment is properly reinstated after testing.

J.3 Remote maintenance - l&HAS

Prior to remote access a written agreement should be made between the alarm company responsible for maintenance and the client. The agreement should include details of the aspects of maintenance to be carried out remotely and actions to be taken in the event of faults or other issues being identified.