Elements of delay
Overview of elements of delay
Fence;
wall;
- topping;
traffic barrier;
gate: swing, sliding, cantilever, speedgate, folding;
turnstile;
bollard: retractable, fixed;
road block, wedge barrier;
standoff;
distance between fence lines;
water (ponds etc.);
vegetation.
Fences
Perimeter fencing should be installed to provide enhanced protection:
To provide a clear demarcation between the site and the surrounding area;
To act as a deterrent to unauthorized access into the site;
To delay unauthorized entry to and exit from site by climbing, cutting or burrowing;
A fence should be over 1,8 m in height (indicative) below which there is considered to be no delay.
To assist in the control of access to and egress from the site;
To assist in deterring and preventing vehicle intrusion through adoption of hostile vehicle impact mitigation measures;
(optional) To lend itself to support a vibration-based detection system.
In line with Table 2 with a first impression of possible solutions given a desired Level of protection, Table 3 illustrates a possible set-up for a classification for fences. It should be clear that this set-up is only indicative, both with respect to the number of classes and the description of those classes.
Table 3 — Tentative classes for fences
Level of protection |
Fence class „TENTATIVE |
Description |
1 |
1 |
A physical barrier that whilst not being designed to meet any particular security requirements, provides a minimum legal barrier to mark the boundary of the site. The barrier would, however, provide a deterrent to prevent unauthorized access. |
2 |
2 |
A physical barrier to deter intruders offering a degree of resistance to climbing and breaching by an opportunist not having particular skills and using materials and breaching items that are readily to hand. The barrier also acts as boundary demarcation preventing accidental egress without drawing attention. |
3 |
3 |
An intermediate security barrier that will deter and delay a resourceful and experienced intruder who has access to a limited range of tools and equipment. The design will offer resistance to attempts at climbing and breaching and will delay access for persons intent on unauthorized access. |
4 |
4 |
A high security barrier that is designed to offer maximum deterrence and delay to both climb and penetration to the most determined and experienced intruder who is well resourced with tools that may not be readily available on the street. A Class 4 fence will need to be supported by [PIDS, lighting]. |
Protection from vehicle-based attacks may be a requirement. In that case any of the following functions may be required:
maintain blast stand-off;
prevent encroachment;
stop penetrative attack;
control vehicle access;
enforce speed management measures.
Besides requirements directly related to perimeter protection, other requirements will also have to be considered, like the following:
windloads shall not cause an unacceptable level of loading or deflection to the fence panels that would negatively affect operations or safety;
changes in direction of a welded mesh fences line shall not affect the mesh deflection;
the rattle or vibration to the fence panels shall be minimal.
Walls
Instead of using a fence as physical barrier at the perimeter of a site, a concrete or masonry wall can be in place. Take into consideration that potential intruders do not like to be seen on the site.
Barriers
Traffic barriers are used to offer limited protection against unauthorized vehicular access to the site.
Gates
The height, design and construction of gates should have a similar protection according to the adjoining fence. Hinges should be constructed in such a way as to prevent lifting and should be shielded, in order to prevent their use as ladders or climbing frames. It should not be possible to gain access under the gate. The locking device of a gate should be securely mounted and protected.
Roadblockers, Bollards
Road blockers and Bollards provide a physical barrier against unauthorized entry of a vehicle into a site at defined access and egress points.
The physical protection of a site against the use of vehicles for a criminal purpose will in most cases not be limited to the sole application of access control through physical obstacles.
Elements of detection
Introduction
Where automated detection of an intruder is required, an integrated security system comprising a Perimeter Intruder Detection System (PIDS) is needed. It is necessary to define minimum intruder criteria height of X m or more and a mass of X kg or more, crossing the detection zone at a rate of X m/s to Ym/s.
The types of attack styles (Modus operandi) which the PIDS are required to detect, are to be defined, such as detection of climb or cutting of, or approach to a barrier. The PIDS shall detect and annunciate an alarm for tampering with system enclosures and/or cutting of signal cables.
The PIDS shall cater for a range of host medium I site features, gates, secluded areas, exposed areas with public access to the outside of the barrier. Where multiple PIDS are used, they should not interfere with each other.
A method of validating the alarm should be considered to separate false alarms from true alarms, which require a guard force response. Validation can be achieved through assessment of CCTV, footage, although it may also be carried out manually by guard force.
When providing CCTV footage to validate an alarm, the following measures can increase the effectiveness of validation:
appropriate picture quality to verify the cause of alarm;
matching the CCTV zones with the PIDS zones to make it easier for alarm validation to be performed; and
collecting footage immediately before, during and after the alarm.
Overview of elements of detection
Detection;
Exterior sensors PIDS;
Lighting;Entry/exit control.
Detection
Perimeter intrusion detection systems are based on the core principle of establishing a steady background state and continuously monitoring to detect any change above or below a predetermined threshold which indicates that an intrusion event has occurred.
Like all technologies, these systems are constantly evolving. Although new improved equipment is being developed and introduced into the marketplace, the fundamental detection principles and applications rarely change.
Exterior sensors PIDS
There is a large and diverse range of sensing technologies available for perimeter security, varying in their effectiveness, affordability and accuracy. When evaluating any of the available technologies, the major requirements are:
system durability/reliability;
minimal nuisance alarms;
maximum detection capability;
minimal maintenance;
ability to accurately pinpoint the location of intrusion;
ability to function with other existing or complementary technologies.
Regardless of the selected system, the need for adequate warning and a response mechanism for unwanted intrusion is crucial. It is not sufficient only to know that a breach of the perimeter has occurred.
Lighting
Security lighting should be designed in such a way as to avoid shadow areas that favour aggressors by enabling them to operate without being seen.
Security lighting can be used to:
lighten a vehicle/pedestrian access point;
aid visual observation by patrolling guards;
support CCTV surveillance or Video Based Detection;
offer concealment of guards and/or activity;
deter entry into the area.
Entry/exit control
The entrance is the first means of controlling access to any site. Gates and barriers should only be opened for persons and vehicles.
The entrance forms an integral part of the perimeter protection solution in order to control access to the site. Admission of vehicles should be through controlled gates, the control being exercised by an attendant or electronic access systems.
External elements
The following external elements are distinguished:
alarm communication;
response;
response force;
response force communication.
Local law and regulations
Local law and regulations might influence the perimeter security solution. As safety on a site is a prime importance there are regulations regarding escape routes, access of emergency vehicles.
Inventories
Inventories of current systems and (generic type) product, relevant member states regulations, relevant documents from CEN, CEN/TC 325, ISO and other sources have been made. The results are presented in annexes to this report.
Annex A 'Security system operational requirements - Q and А' intends to convey a general understanding of a the operational requirement for a security system through a format of questions and answers.
Annex C 'An environmental and organizational checklist for perimeter protection' consists of two lists of questions to be asked when assessing the need for security measures. The first list is about What are the environmental factors that will influence the solution?'(C.2). The second list is about 'What are the organizational factors that will influence the solution? (C.3).
In Annex D 'А perimeter security technologies classification' a subdivision of the technologies of intrusion detection is proposed into four main families (clusters). A table for each family resumes exhaustively the technologies that have been identified. For each family, a list of technical and functional features details the possibilities and the limits of each technology.
Annex E 'Inventory of perimeter intruder detection systems (PIDs)' consists of a list of information regarding perimeter intruder detection systems (PIDs). Information is given on some typical characteristics and fields of application. An indication is also given whether or not European or National standardization has taken place.
Annex F 'Matrix of current systems and (generic type) products' consists of a matrix of current perimeter protection systems and products. The generic product types are subdivided into the following categories: Permanent, Redeployable, Perimeter access, Gates and Barriers etc. The matrix gives the information in the following columns: Application, Standards/Guidance, Security - Application dependent, CEN/ Cenelec (1) and CEN/ Cenelec (2).
Annex G 'On Perimeter surveillance and burglary resistance' deals with the following two subjects: Use of detection systems for perimeter protection and Classification for burglary resistance.
In Annex H 'Pictures offences, gates and entrance barriers' a non-exhaustive list is given of the different sorts of fences, supplementary accessories and gates and entrance barriers that can be found around private, commercial, industrial, military sites or installations.It should be noted that these inventories cannot be considered complete; by nature they will be dated at some stage. The reader should be aware that any values given in these annexes are indicative values.
On testing
In the general conceptual framework for perimeter protection systems evaluation as presented in Annex B, Testing' is a way of verifying the (proposed) perimeter protection solution against the functional requirements.
Besides that, there is the testing of individual systems or components for Technical Specifications. An example of this kind of testing is described in CEN Workshop Agreement CWA 16221:2010 'Vehicle security barriers - Performance requirements, test methods and guidance on application'; see also Annex I.
Both kinds of testing are beyond the scope of the present Technical Report
.Annex A
Security system operational requirements - Q and A
This annex intends to convey a general understanding of a the operational requirement for a security system through a format of questions and answers.
The first draft of this annex originated from the United Kingdom.
Detection
What are you trying to detect?
— People (general public, criminals, deadly and determined, specific individuals);
— Vehicles (cars, boats, planes, bicycles, specific vehicles, other);
— Objects (thrown packages, stationary packages, weapons).
Where are you trying to detect them?
— Immediately outside but adjacent to a secure area (no man's land);
— Attempting to breach a cordoned secure area;
— Within a secure area.
Define the secure area - Map detail required showing public areas, no man's land and cordoned secure area?
Can the area be divided into zones - define zones?
What is likely outcome of a breach of the secure area (zone)?
— Theft;
— Threat to Protected Persons;
— Damage to property;
— Compromise of Information;
— Personal Injury.
Notification
Who is to be notified of all alarms generated?
— Anyone within range of secure area (Alarm Bells, Sirens);
— Covertly anyone within range (covert search team);
— Dedicated control room for alarm verification;
— Assigned personnel remote from secure area.
What timescale?
— Within 10 s;
— Within a minute;
— Within 10 min;
— Post event.
What information is required?
— Breach of secure area (single zone);
— Breach of specific zone.
How will they be notified?
— Mobile personnel notification equipment (radio, local pager, pager, mobile call, SMS);
— Global notification equipment (bells, sirens, triggered lighting);
— Control room notification (radio, local pager, pager, mobile call, SMS, email, GUI, mimic panel). Verification
Who will perform verification of alarm?
— Site security team;
— Dedicated control room (requires pre/live/post video and/or audio);
— Assigned personnel remote from secure area;
— Offsite response deployed to verify alarm.
What are actions on known false alarm (wildlife, environment)?
— Log and investigate;
— Log and investigate and take action.
What are actions on unknown false alarm?
— Log and investigate;
— Log and investigate and take action.
What are actions on verification of intruder detection?
— Log and investigate;
— Notify on-site active security team;
— Log and notify dedicated onsite security team (how);
— Log and notify dedicated remote intervention team (how).
What is acceptable timescale between detection and verification?
— Less than 1 min;
— Up to 10 min;
— Up to 1 h.
Who makes final decision?
Further notification (Alarm distribution)
Who will be notified of verification of intruder detection?
— Site security team;
— Dedicated onsite intervention team;
— Dedicated offsite intervention team;
— Assigned personnel remote from secure area.
What information is required?
— Type of breach, number of attackers, etc.;
— Verification of breach of specific zone.
How will they be notified?
— Personnel notification equipment (radio, local pager, pager, mobile call, SMS, email, GUI, mimic panel);
— Other.Annex В
Framework for perimeter protection systems evaluation
Figure B.1 illustrates the general conceptual framework for perimeter protection systems evaluation. It includes the sequence of steps in the performance classification methodology as presented in this Technical Report.CEN/TR 16705:2014 (E)
Requirements
Solutions
Que»tiwmsire
Modus Operandl
«ясли
I Desired performance i
RISKS
Functional requirement*
Threat*'
Site cherecXertMtion
21 «етеМде*
і ikrert ectrnul гл«*«
Phytic») protection ny»nm
Gmwnw of Miy
Wan
Topping
Tumeafe
Road block, wedge Lanier
Fntrvi'exk control
Level of protection
Potential risk
External element*
Response
Response force
Local law and reguiavsn*
■-. Site efteraeterteaUon
Testing
Figure B.1
Framework for perimeter protection systems evaluation
Annex C
An environmental and organizational checklist for perimeter protection
C.1 Introduction
WARNING: Any values given in this annex are indicative values and can vary according to the product.
This annex consists of two lists of questions to be asked when assessing the need for security measures.
The first list helps to answer the question 'What are the environmental factors that will influence the solution?'(C.2). The second list helps to answer the question 'What are the organizational factors that will influence the solution? (C.3).
The first draft of this annex originates from Belgium.
C.2 Environmental checklist for perimeter protection
What are the environmental factors that will influence the solution?
Table C.1 — Environmental checklist for perimeter protection
Topic |
Question |
Comment |
E.1. General |
What can define the secure area? |
Map detail required showing public areas, no man's land and cordoned secure area |
|
Can the area be divided into zones - define zones? |
|
|
Are there any developments in the surrounding area? |
Surrounding developments may also mean that a risk analysis has to be carried out again. For example, if a residential neighbourhood is created in the vicinity, any emissions may have a more significant impact; or if new neighbouring companies with safety policies that differ from those of their predecessors are being established (with possible effects on the security of our organization). |
|
||
E.2. Surroundings |
Are there dwellings in the immediate vicinity? |
Are these low-rise or high-rise? |
|
Is it a mono-site (a site just for the organization concerned) or is it an industrial estate? |
Are the adjoining industrial sites and neighbouring companies protected or not? |
|
Are there any undeveloped sites in the immediate vicinity? |
Are these open or wooded? Are they accessible? |
|
Are there parking spaces outside the company gates that are publicly accessible (from which people could make undisturbed observations)? |
Is this parking area monitored or not? |
|
||
E.3. Accessibility |
|
|
Topic |
Question |
Comment |
E.3.1. Road |
Define legitimate pedestrian / vehicular access points. For which mode of transport are they suitable: pedestrian, bike, car? Are these monitored or not? |
When using PIDS, these access points may require certain zones to be switched off at particular times of day, for instance. |
|
Are there vehicular traffic routes adjacent to the perimeter? |
Vehicular traffic can cause vibrations which, if in close proximity to certain PIDS types, could cause false alarms. Furthermore, passive infrared systems are sensitive to distance hot objects, i.e. vehicles. If they are not angled correctly, they could be triggered by the hot engines of vehicles passing by. |
|
||
E.3.2. Rail |
Does the railway line and the train enter into the industrial site? |
|
|
Is the loading point inside or outside the gateway? |
|
|
Is the access gate monitored? |
|
|
Is there a continuing rail connection on which trains for other organizations can pass (multi-usage)? |
|
|
||
E.3.3. Air |
Define the type of facilities that run over the industrial site. |
High-voltage lines? Flight routes? Bridges and viaducts? Aircraft can cause vibrations in the air, which could be transferred to the PIDS. |
|
||
E.3.4. Water |
Define rivers and streams in adjacent to the site. |
Moving water within the detection field of microwave systems could cause them to false alarm. |
|
Are there areas with standing water following heavy rainfall? |
|
|
Does the organization use a supply via the water (port, river)? |
|
|
Is the port private? Is the quayside for ships private? |
|
|
Can fishing boats, leisure craft and other ships enter the area at their will? |
|
|
||
E.4. Weather |
What is the temperature that can be expected? |
Range to be defined: -20 °С to +55 °С (outdoor equipment); 0 °С to 40 °С (indoor equipment) Temperature differentials (e.g. caused by clouds moving across the sun) and rapid temperature change can have an impact on the occurrence of false alarms for some systems. Air temperature can vary considerably with respect to ground surface temperature. |
|
What is the humidity that can be expected? |
Range to be defined: 0 % to 95 % noncondensing (outdoor equipment); 10% to 90 % |