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ПІДТВЕРДЖУВАЛЬНЕ ПОВІДОМЛЕННЯ

Наказом Міністерства економічного розвитку і торгівлі України
від 30.12.2014 № 1494

CEN/TR 16705:2014

en: Perimeter protection - Performance classification methodology
прийнято як національний стандарт
методом підтвердження за позначенням

ДСТУ CEN/TR 16705:2014

uk: Захист периметру. Методологія класифікації виконання
(CEN/TR 16705:2014, IDT)

З наданням чинності від 2016-01-01

CEN/TR16705

April 2014

Protection perimetrique - Methode de classification de
performance

Schutz von Grundstucksgrenzen - Methodologie fur eine
Leistungsklassifizierung

TECHNICAL REPORT

RAPPORT TECHNIQUE

TECHNISCHER BERICHT

ICS 13.310

English Version

Perimeter protection - Performance classification methodology

This Technical Report was approved by CEN on 25 March 2014. It has been drawn up by the Technical Committee CEN/TC 388.

CEN members are the national standards bodies of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and United Kingdom.

EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR STANDARDIZATION
СОМІТЁ EUROPEEN DE NORMALISATION
EUROPAISCHES KOMITEE FUR NORMUNG

CEN-CENELEC Management Centre: Avenue Marnix 17, B-1000 Brussels

©

Ref. No. CEN/TR 16705:2014 E

2014 CEN All rights of exploitation in any form and by any means reserved worldwide for CEN national Members

.Contents Page

Foreword 5

0 Introduction 6

0.1 Purpose 6

0.2 Approach 6

0.3 Vital infrastructure 6

1. Scope 7

2. Normative references 7

3. Terms and definitions 7

4. Performance classification methodology 15

   1. Outline of the approach 15

   2. Determining the required the level of protection - picture of the methodology 16

   3. Assumptions and starting point making the calculation model 18

   4. The questionnaire of the calculation the model 20

      1. Introduction to the questionnaire 20

      2. Text of the questionnaire annex data entry sheet 21

5. Modus operandi 24

   1. Introduction 24

   2. Aggressor types 24

   3. Scenarios 25

   4. Toolsets 25

6. Risk assessment methodology 25

   1. General 25

   2. Risk - Target identification 26

   3. Threats 26

   4. Site characterization 26

      1. General 26

      2. Site and physical environment 26

      3. Human and social factors of the environment 27

      4. Use of the site 27

      5. Type of access 27

7. Level of protection 27

8. Determining functional requirements 28

   1. Introduction 28

   2. Questions for establishing the functional requirement 28

9. Elements of possible solutions 29

   1. Introduction 29

   2. Elements of delay 29

      1. Overview of elements of delay 29

      2. Fences 30

      3. Walls 31

      4. Barriers 32

      5. Gates 32

      6. Roadblockers, Bollards 32

   3. Elements of detection 32

      1. Introduction 32

      2. Overview of elements of detection 32

      3. Detection 33

      4. Exterior sensors PI DS 33

      5. Lighting 33

      6. Entry/exit control 33

   4. External elements 34

   5. Local law and regulations 34

10. Inventories 34

11. On testing 35

1. Security system operational requirements - Q and A 36

2. Framework for perimeter protection systems evaluation 39

3. An environmental and organizational checklist for perimeter protection 41

C.1 Introduction 41

C.2 Environmental checklist for perimeter protection 41

C.3 Organizational checklist for perimeter protection 45

4. A perimeter security technologies classification 49

D.1 Introduction 49

D.2 Four families for intrusion detection 49

D.2.1 Structure of the annex 49

D.2.2 Structure of the four main Tables D.3 to D.6 50

D.3 Stand-alone equipment 54

D.4 Fence-mounted sensors 58

D.5 Active Physical security 59

D.6 Underground sensors 62

5. Inventory of perimeter intruder detection systems (PIDs) 64

E.1 Introduction 64

E.2 Combination of two sensors 65

6. Matrix of current systems and (generic type) products 71

7. On Perimeter surveillance and burglary resistance 86

G.1 Introduction 86

G.2 Use of detection systems for perimeter protection 86

G.2.1 Basic requirements for perimeter surveillance systems 86

G.2.2 Basic principles of the detection systems 88

G.2.3 Comparison of detection systems 89

G.2.4 Summary 89

G.3 Classification for burglary resistance 90

G.3.1 Recommendations for the assessment of the resistance class 90

G.3.2 DIN-Standards for burglar resistance 91

8. Pictures offences, gates and entrance barriers 92

H.1 Introduction 92

H.2 Different sorts of fences 92

H.2.1 Vegetable fences 92

H.2.2 Wood palisade 93

H.2.3 Walls 94

H.2.4 Metallic fences 96

H.2.5 Combinations of systems 99

H.3 Supplementary accessories 100

H.3.1 Razor wire 100

H.3.2 Sharp pins 100

H.4 Gates and entrance barriers 101

H.4.1 Gates 101

H .4.2 Road obstacles 102

Annex I CEN Workshop Agreement CWA 16221 104

Bibliography 109Foreword

This document (CEN/TR 16705:2014) has been prepared by Technical Committee CEN/TC 388 “Perimeter protection”, the secretariat of which is held by NEN.

Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of patent rights. CEN [and/or CENELEC] shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.

The elaboration of this Technical Specification has been financially supported by the European Commission and the CIPS Programme (Grant Agreement № HCME/2009/CIPS/FP/CEN-001).0 Introduction

0.1 Purpose

The increasing need for customers to be able to select and purchase perimeter protection solutions that fit their needs calls for a generic and structured approach to the assessment of risks, to the identification of functional requirements, to the classification of perimeter protection solutions, including organizational measures, and to the design and test criteria for such perimeter protection solutions. This Technical Report is a step in the development of that approach.

The general goal that has been set is to make a European Standard that is applicable to a wide range of perimeter protection solutions, covering the needs for basic barriers and entrance solutions to more complex, high security solutions.

This Technical Report firstly describes the conceptual basis for further development of security performance requirements, technical specifications and test methods for use in perimeter protection systems in a European context. The report focusses on the performance classification methodology for the identification of the desired systems performance.

Secondly this Technical Report presents the results of inventories that have been made on current systems and (generic type) products that are available to the design engineer in both the public and private sector, relevant member states regulations, relevant documents from CEN, CEN/TC 325, ISO and other sources. The results are presented in annexes to this report.

This Technical Report therefore aims at providing information to be used for the design of future activities for making the 'perimeter protection standard'. It is not intended as a guidance for the actual development of perimeter protection systems. Nonetheless the information in this report may function as an aid to practitioners in their choice of appropriate measures in order to meet the diverse requirements.

0.2 Approach

Perimeter protection projects call for the interaction between suppliers of perimeter protection solutions, their customers and other relevant stakeholders. Only the proper interaction between these parties will lead to valid analyses and a certified perimeter protection solution.

A sequence of steps leading to the risk assessment, requested level of protection, functional requirements and basic selection of perimeter protection solution is proposed. The choice of the measure(s) to be taken depends upon a number of factors which include but are not restricted to: the local environment, the purpose of the measure(s), type property to be protected and environmental and organizational factors.

Perimeter protection systems or components may be used independently such as a perimeter fence or in combination with other measures in order to provide a more holistic solution such as a fence and gate. This approach may be extended to include Closed-Circuit TV systems (CCTV) and Perimeter Intruder Devices (PID).

To determine the risk involved for a site requiring perimeter protection is, for the most part, comparable to the analysis required for any given asset. Therefore this Technical Report builds on the work done for risk analysis by CEN/TC 325 'Crime prevention through building, facility and area design'.

0.3 Vital infrastructure

It is recognized that with regard to vital infrastructure and very high risk objects, the generic approach indicated in this Technical Report may not suffice and additional checklists and risk assessment tools may be required. There will be particular threats and modus operand! that should be considered when assessing vital infrastructure and very high risk objects that are outside the scope of this TR. For this reference can be made to documents from national authorities, etc.

1. Scope

This Technical Report aims at providing information to be used for the design of the future activities for making a 'perimeter protection standard'.

This CEN Technical Report describes a performance classification methodology for the identification of the desired systems performance for perimeter protection systems. It also gives a conceptual framework for matching the desired performance and the capabilities of a possible solution.

Furthermore this CEN Technical Report presents the results of inventories that have been made on current systems and (generic type) products, relevant member states regulations, relevant documents from CEN, CEN/TC 325, ISO and other sources. It should be noted that these inventories cannot be considered complete and any values given should be considered indicative values.

The following subjects are not covered by this Technical Report:

threats approaching from the sea side;

threats approaching through the air.

It is recognized that with regard to vital infrastructure and very high risk objects the generic system approach indicated in this Technical Report may not suffice and additional checklists and risk assessment tools may be required.

2. Normative references

Not applicable.

3. Terms and definitions

For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply.

NOTE The terms have been divided into three main perimeter related security categories: General, Electronic Security and Physical Security. The definitions are taken from existing documents as much as possible. Important sources are EN 14383-1:2006 [1], the term and definition standard from CEN/TC 325 "Crime prevention through building, facility and area design", and the Centre for Applied Science and Technology (CAST) [2].

access control

set of techniques, means or procedures to control the passage of people and vehicles into and out of protected areas

[SOURCE: EN 14383-1:2006]

Note 1 to entry: Such systems allow levels of access rights and optionally the traceability of access, ranging from no entry to free traffic. The access control can be mechanical, human, electronic or a combination of these systems.

burglary

action of breaking into any premises with the purpose of theft

[SOURCE: EN 14383-1: 2006, modified]

neighbourhood

immediate surroundings of a secure site and their population

[SOURCE: EN 14383-1:2006]

operational requirement

statement of needs based upon a thorough and systematic assessment of the problems to be solved and the desired solutions

[SOURCE: PAS 68:2013]

perimetric space

space in close vicinity of the building (from the perimeter to the building envelope, including the accesses)

[SOURCE: EN 14383-1:2006]

peripheral space

land and neighbourhood around one or several sites

[SOURCE: EN 14383-1:2006]

risk analysis

identification and evaluation of threats

[SOURCE: EN 14383-1:2006, modified]

risk assessment

categorization of risks and measurement of their likelihood

[SOURCE: EN 14383-1:2006]

safety

freedom from unacceptable risk

[SOURCE: EN 14383-1:2006]

secure area

mechanically and/or electronically enclosed area protected for safety and/or security purposes [1]

security

freedom from an intended risk

[SOURCE: EN 14383-1:2006]

Note 1 to entry: Security is the condition of being protected against danger or loss. It is achieved through the mitigation of adverse consequences associated with the intentional or unwarranted actions of others. See [7].

standoff

distance that threat (e.g. vehicle, person, any potential explosive effect) may be allowed to encroach upon a perimeter or asset

[SOURCE: PAS 38:2013]

active infrared

infrared beams transmitted between a transmitter and receiver which are broken when an intruder passes through

[SOURCE: PAS 38:2013]

Note 1 to entry: The receiver detects this as a drop in signal level.

alarm transmission

automatic transmission of alarm signals from an intrusion detection system to a monitoring centre or to a private individual

[SOURCE: EN 14383-1: 2006]

dead zone

area bounded by, or laying within the detection zone where a target cannot be detected

Note 1 to entry: That is either intrinsic to the detection system or due to some topographical feature within the detection zone (i.e. obstacle or hollow).

detection rate (DR)

measure of a system’s capacity to detect an intrusion attempt (true alarm) through the zone protected by the system

[SOURCE: Centre for Applied Science and Technology (CAST)]

detection zone

area over which a detection system is configured to monitor for intruders

Note 1 to entry: The detection zone can also have upper and lower bounds: the detection ceiling and the detection floor.

doppler microwave

unit that emits a microwave field and monitors reflections

[SOURCE: Centre for Applied Science and Technology (CAST)]

Note 1 to entry: Motions from an intruder cause a change in the reflected signal received by the detector.

dual technology

combination of two separate technologies

[SOURCE: Centre for Applied Science and Technology (CAST)]

Note 1 to entry: For free-standing applications these technologies tend to be passive Infrared combined with doppler microwave, though other combinations exist.

3.2.8

environmental information / conditions

data pertaining to both weather and wildlife events in the vicinity of the perimeter

[SOURCE: Centre for Applied Science and Technology (CAST)]

3.2.9

electrified fence

detection system comprising horizontal electrical conductors which are energized approximately every 2 s with typically a 10,000 volt pulse

[SOURCE: Centre for Applied Science and Technology (CAST)]

Note 1 to entry: This pulse voltage will decrease if the fence is touched or is short circuited to ground and an alarm condition can be raised.

3.2.10

electrostatic field disturbance

arrays of wires create an electromagnetic field and sense either the current induced in neighbouring wires or the capacitance between the transmitter and the ground

[SOURCE: Centre for Applied Science and Technology (CAST)]

Note 1 to entry: The capacitancy varies when an intruder approaches the barrier. Ported coax and leaky feeder systems come under this definition.

3.2.11

fabric-mounted PIDS

detection systems that are attached directly to the barrier material (as opposed to the fence posts)

[SOURCE: Centre for Applied Science and Technology (CAST)]

3.2.12

false alarm

alarm not caused by a human breaching the detection zone

[SOURCE: Centre for Applied Science and Technology (CAST)]

Note 1 to entry: Typically, false alarms are caused by animals, the effects of the weather or may have no obvious cause.

Note 2 to entry: Alternative definition:

alarm condition which has not resulted from:

1. a criminal attack, or attempt at such, upon/to the supervised premises, the alarm equipment or the line carrying the alarm signal; or

2. damage, or attempt at such, to the supervised premises, the alarm equipment or the line carrying the alarm signal; or

3. actions by emergency services in the execution of their duties.

3.2.13

false alarm rate

FAR

measure of a system's capacity to avoid generating alarms which are not caused by human activity

[SOURCE: Centre for Applied Science and Technology (CAST)]

Note 1 to entry; False alarm rate (FAR) is expressed as the number of false alarms per day per kilometre (ADK).

3.2.14

fibre optic - interferometric

deformation of the detection cable causes a change in the path length in the fibre and hence the phase of laser light transmitted within the fibre

[SOURCE: Centre for Applied Science and Technology (CAST)]

3.2.15

fluid-filled tubes

parallel tubes typically filled with liquid are pressurized and connected via a piezoelectric membrane producing a balanced system

[SOURCE: Centre for Applied Science and Technology (CAST)]

Note 1 to entry: Differential pressure on the ground forces the fluid between the tubes and generates a voltage at the piezoelectric element. Requires access pits to pressurize the tubes and house the sensors.

3.2.16

geophone (point sensor)

series of low frequency microphones or accelerometers connected together and their outputs analyzed

[SOURCE: Centre for Applied Science and Technology (CAST)]

Note 1 to entry: Addressable point sensors can attribute alarms to a particular sensor.

3.2.17

height of detection zone

nominal maximum height of the detection zone relative to ground level

3.2.18

inductive cable

cable with conductive wires suspended in a magnetic field

[SOURCE: Centre for Applied Science and Technology (CAST)]

Note 1 to entry: Small currents are induced when the barrier and cable are disturbed.

3.2.19

maximum speed of crossing

maximum speed (metres per second) at which a target crossing the detection zone can travel and be successfully detected